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Abstract The English School is one of the main traditions of thought in International 
Relations and the only one home-grown in Britain. While initially unconcerned with 
questions of integration, and the regional level more generally, its concepts and insights have 
recently been applied to the European integration process. However, an English School 
analysis of the consequences of Brexit has yet to be conducted. This article rectifies this 
omission and offers a broad system-level analysis of major-state withdrawal from deep 
multilateral arrangements. Following a brief introduction to the main phases of English 
School development, the article analyses the consequences of Brexit in terms of three central 
areas: the pluralist-solidarist debate; primary institutions; and great power status. It finds that 
while the adjustment costs of Brexit will be considerable, the longer-term systemic 
consequences are unlikely to be far-reaching. The main consequence is the additional 
pressure Brexit puts on Britain’s precarious great power status. 
Key Words Brexit; English School; International Society; Primary Institutions; Pluralism; 
Solidarism; Great Powers 
Uncertainty has overhung Britain and Europe since the decision of the British people in June 
2016 to leave the European Union (EU). ‘Brexit’ has been the dominant fact in British politics, 
and how it is handled, along with the settlement that is reached, will have far-reaching 
implications for British political, social, economic, and international life for many years to 
come. Given Britain’s size and significance in the European project it will also have profound 
implications for the EU. 
The complexities of Brexit, in both process and outcome, have been explored by an extensive 
range of scholars within Political Science and European Studies (for a review see Oliver 2019). 
Within International Relations (IR), with a few exceptions (Simms 2016), study has been 
largely confined to the possible implications for the EU’s aspirations in the foreign, security 
and defence fields (Biscop 2018), or for Britain’s own foreign policy outlook (Sanders and 
Houghton 2016; Wright 2017). This article takes a more general, systemic perspective by 
applying the concepts and insights of the English School (ES) of International Relations (IR). 
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The ES is now widely acknowledged as one of six or seven major IR theoretical traditions of 
world scale, and the only one home grown in Britain. While many of its leading proponents are 
not English, nor British, it represents in many respects a culturally and intellectually British 
outlook. It is also an outlook which places great weight on the normative structure of 
international society. It is precisely this normative structure that many fear Brexit will 
substantially disturb. Given this, and the recent incursion of ES thinking into the field of 
European integration (e.g. Diez and Whitman 2002; Stivachtis and Webber 2011), an ES 
analysis of Brexit is long overdue. 
The ES is not a policy science, so we do not suppose it will tell us precisely what Britain or the 
EU27 should do at any given point of the negotiations.  Nor is it a predicative theory, so we do 
not suppose it will forecast the outcome of these negotiations, nor project the precise state of 
British-EU relations much into the future. However, as a ‘societal approach’ (Buzan 2014) 
concerned with the norms, rules and institutions of international life, we do expect the ES to 
tell us something significant about the systemic implications of Brexit and its broad 
consequences for Britain. 
The paper begins with an overview of the school for those unfamiliar with its major tenets. 
Three main areas of ES concern are identified that relate to Brexit: the tension between pluralist 
and solidarist conceptions of international society; the nature and role of primary institutions; 
and the source and significance of great power status. Each of these is then examined in relation 
to Brexit, focusing on the (potentially) shifting institutional landscape, the pluralist reaction to 
solidarism, and the risks posed to Britiain’s great power status.  The article concludes that while 
the systemic consequences of Britain’s withdrawal from the EU are unlikely to be deep or far-
reaching, the consequences for Britain’s continued great power status are likely to be profound. 
 
The English School: Overview 
The ES is a body of theory about international relations with its tap root in the Department of 
International Relations at LSE and significant side roots at the universities of Cambridge, 
Oxford, Aberystwyth and increasingly far beyond Britain. Its evolution is comprised of four 
overlapping phases, with the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics (1954-
1985) being an important vehicle for the development of the first two (Vigezzi 2005). The first 
phase was concerned with the formal structure of the international system, particularly the 
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sovereignty principle, the role of international law, the balance of power and the role of great 
powers. During this phase seminal contributors to the school such as C. A. W. Manning, Hedley 
Bull, Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight, and Alan James established the main components of 
the system, the principal ways they related, and the character of the system thereby produced. 
It was during this phase that the core concept of the school, international society, was 
established, and its chief practical concern, the bases of international order, given wide-ranging 
attention (e.g. James 1973; Bull 1977). The latter concern should come as no surprise given the 
phase was roughly coterminous with the Cold War. The great powers were considered by far 
the most important actors in the system, with small states (especially in the South) and non-
state actors receiving little attention. Indeed, the school’s emphasis on the primacy of the state, 
the role of great powers, and the balance of power, led some to conclude that the ES was not a 
distinctive school of thought but a variant of political realism (e.g. Brown 2001). Structure 
prevailed over process, continuity over change, and order over justice—with some reading an 
unconscious normative bias into this hierarchy of concern (e.g. Callaghan 2004).  
The second phase concerned the expansion of international society, i.e. the worldwide 
geographical expansion of the initially European club of states. The impetus for this series of 
studies was concern about the implications of this expansion for international order. The 
importance of the cultural basis of international order had been established during the first 
phase of scholarship. It was therefore logical to ask, in the wake of the unravelling of the 
Western colonial empires in Asia and Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, and the admittance of 
formerly subject territories into the international club, what were the implications of the 
stretching of the cultural basis of society for international order (Bull and Watson 1984)? From 
the early concern about international order, ES attention shifted to the nature of the process. 
Keene (2002), for example, developed what might be called a proto-postcolonial account of 
the centrality of colonial expansion to European political self-identity, the European club of 
states from the outset resting on notions of exclusivity and superiority. Buzan (2010) identified 
Vanguardist and Syncretist accounts of the expansion story, mirroring the earlier debate among 
economic historians between metropolitan and peripheral theories of nineteenth century 
imperialism (e.g. Cain and Hopkins 2016, 33-72). Most recently Dunne and Reus-Smit (2017) 
have challenged the eurocentrism and linearity of the standard Bull and Watson account. 
Overlapping this phase, from the 1980s the ES developed a concern about human rights and 
the purposes of international society. Order remained the chief concern, but richer accounts 
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challenging the order-justice dichotomy began to appear, inspired by Vincent’s seminal (1986) 
study of human rights. Under Vincent’s influence much of the debate was framed in terms of 
Bull’s (1966) distinction between solidarist and pluralist conceptions of international society. 
In Bull’s original formulation solidarists emphasized ‘the solidarity, or potential solidarity, of 
the states comprising international society, with respect to the enforcement of the law’. 
Pluralists by way of contrast stressed the lack of solidarity and the capability of agreement 
‘only for certain minimum purposes’ (Bull, 1966: 52). Later formulations, however, broadened 
the notions—responding to developments in international political theory, not the least 
Nardin’s (1983) distinction between practical and purpose associations, and Brown’s (1993) 
analysis of the communitarian-cosmopolitan divide. Few now would disagree with Buzan’s 
(2014: 16) definition of pluralism as ‘the communitarian disposition towards a state-centric 
mode of association in which sovereignty and non-intervention serve to contain and sustain 
cultural and political diversity’; solidarism being ‘the disposition either to transcend the states-
system with some other mode of association or to develop it beyond the logic of coexistence 
to one of cooperation on shared projects’. A central empirical question became the extent to 
which growth in concern for human rights was propelling the society of states in a solidarist 
direction, with some arguing for a critical international society approach in which the 
normative potential of international society would become progressively unlocked (Wheeler 
2000; Linklater and Suganami 2006). Others meanwhile clung to a more conservative, 
nominally detached approach, wary of aspirations going beyond the limited capacity of the 
club of states for virtuous behaviour (Jackson 2000). In time more sophisticated solidarist 
accounts have been developed, distinguishing for example between cosmopolitan and state-
centric solidarisms (Buzan 2014: 114-20). Similarly, more ethically positive conceptions of 
pluralism have been developed (Hurrell 2007; Williams 2015), shifting the focus away from 
reluctant acceptance of the limited normative horizons of international society in the face of 
cultural, ethical and political heterogeneity, towards acknowledgment of the vital role 
international rules and norms play in preserving valuable diversity. 
The final phase of ES development concerns the institutional bases of international society. 
With roots in the writings of classic ES scholars Wight and Bull, contemporary ES scholars are 
conducting theoretical and empirical work on the identity, function and significance of the 
primary or fundamental institutions of international society, including their role as markers of 
change (Holsti 2004). New taxonomies of primary institutions have been developed (Buzan 
2004), their role in binding together regional international societies has been explored 
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(Schouenborg 2012), and their co-constitutive relationship with international organizations 
such as the EU and UN investigated (Knudsen and Navari 2018). Valuable work on individual 
institutions has been done (Sharp and Wiseman 2008; Clark 2011; Falkner and Buzan 2019), 
and structural functionalist method has been employed to understand their evolution over time 
(Buzan and Schouenborg 2018). While questions remain about the ability to empirically ground 
primary institutions and arrive at a settled list (Wilson 2012), this is proving to be a highly 
productive phase of ES development. 
 
The English School and Brexit 
Superficially, the ES is an unpromising approach for analysing Brexit. It has had little to say 
about regional integration. Its interest in European integration has largely been confined to the 
issue of sovereignty, especially whether the creation of a new kind multinational entity such as 
the EU undermines the staple ES conception of sovereignty as ‘constitutional independence’ 
(James 1986; Jackson 1999). This is largely due to the level of analysis of most ES studies. 
While individual country studies are not unknown (e.g. James 1996), and attention to regional 
international societies is now a significant sub-field (e.g. Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez 2009; 
Knudsen and Navari 2018), the school prides itself in being in the business of general IR theory, 
concerned primarily with system-level questions. While the formation of the EEC in the 1950s 
and its evolution into the hybrid polity of polities of todayii has profound regional significance, 
the ES has deemed its wider significance as minor. Firstly, it is granted that the EU is no mere 
inter-state organization, but a new ‘post-Westphalian’ polity, with a wide array of common 
policies, an elaborate institutional structure, an extensive pragmatically-evolving network of 
trans-border administrative relations, and (for most members) a common currency. But this is 
precisely what makes the EU sui generis. Contra Andrew Linklater (1998, 204) it is unlikely 
to ‘become a model of post-Westphalian political organization which is emulated by regions 
elsewhere’. Secondly, even if this new polity evolves into a European super-state the systemic 
consequence is merely the reduction in the number of members of international society 
(Jackson 2007: 151-52). Either way, therefore, the steady expansion (and now the probable 
slight contraction) of the EU has limited consequences for international society. This is 
especially so for some members of the ES because part of the EU’s uniqueness resides in its 
failure to develop a substantial defence capability and identity (Bull 1982). If such a capability 
and identity were in place the withdrawal of one of the two member-states possessing 
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significant military power would have considerable consequences for international security. 
But defence is entrusted to NATO, and therefore the reduction in membership by one of the 
‘alliance within the alliance’ (Bull 1982: 164) is not, as far as defence and security relationships 
are concerned, significant. Of course, since Bull wrote, the membership of both NATO and the 
EU has expanded, and the defence agenda has broadened to include a range of non-
conventional threats. Yet the fact remains that responsibility for European security, especially 
traditional military security, resides largely with NATO. 
Similarly, the ES is an unpromising starting point for thinking about Brexit because it has 
largely ignored economics. While exceptions to the rule are noteworthy (e.g. Mayall 1990), it 
is true that the economic dimension of international relations has been marginal to the school’s 
efforts, with phenomena such as interdependence and globalisation not seriously analysed until 
recently (e.g. Buzan 2004; Buzan and Lawson 2015). The economic consequences of Brexit, 
however, have dominated debates both in Britain and the EU. The decoupling of Britain from 
an elaborate network of economic and financial rules and institutions, and the arrangements 
that will replace them, is the central subject of public debate and official negotiation. It is worth 
emphasising that Britain has not only become subject to these rules and institutions since 
joining in 1973 but it has had a major hand in shaping them, particularly the Single European 
Market. The ES’s neglect of international political economy, let alone European political 
economy, means that it brings little to the economic table. 
This paper contends, however, that three areas of ES scholarly endeavour provide a unique and 
valuable resource for ascertaining the international consequences of Brexit by placing it in a 
broader context. These are: the pluralist-solidarist debate; the relationship between primary 
institutions; and the role and status of great powers. These connect to three of the four main 
phases of the English School’s evolution. Each provides a rich history of analysis and debate 
that can be profitably applied to Brexit. 
 
Pluralist-Solidarist Debate 
Hedley Bull’s classic view was that international society was a pluralist association of nations. 
From time to time certain members harboured solidarist aspirations, most notably at the end of 
the two world wars when attempts were made to enshrine common principles and goals, and 
create new, universal organisations dedicated to their achievement. These attempts, however, 
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were only superficially successful. In a culturally, ethically, economically and politically 
diverse world states rarely agree for long on common moral purposes. A period of calamitous 
disorder is often followed by a period of great power unity, but it seldom lasts. The common 
rules of international society are essentially rules of co-existence. Their purpose is to ensure 
that different and sometimes widely disparate political communities can live together relatively 
peaceably. The move from this pluralist model of peaceful coexistence to the solidarist model 
of common moral goals and purposes is one fraught with danger, and in Bull’s view one best 
not made lest the delicate fabric of international society is torn apart (Bull 1984, 14). The 
United Nations (UN) and the network of rules and institutions it has spawned is therefore not 
to be interpreted as a substantial let alone revolutionary development. Rather it represents a 
change in the appearance of international politics, the substance remaining essentially 
unchanged. 
Debate about the world historical significance of the UN continues (e.g. Mazower 2012), and 
the sceptical view propounded by Bull continues to be voiced, even at times of renewed 
optimism about its potential (e.g. Righter 1994). Not in doubt, however, are the extraordinary 
solidarist strides taken by the EEC/EC/EU. This too is a heterogeneous body, but since its 
foundation in the 1950s it has developed common policies in agriculture, fisheries, trade, 
regional development, environmental protection, nuclear energy, foreign affairs and security. 
19 of its members share a common currency. The Single European Market is the largest single 
economic area in the world in terms of value of goods and services traded.  It makes policy 
through several formal institutions, with democratic oversight through a directly elected 
parliament, and its laws enforced by single EU-wide court. Since 1993 its citizens have enjoyed 
a common European citizenship, albeit a ‘thin’ one contingent on prior national EU-member 
citizenship (Diez and Whitman 2002: 51-55). 
There is no consensus among scholars on the political ontology of the EU, with 
intergovernmentalists, consociationalists, functionalists and federalists offering contrasting 
interpretations. Yet for ES scholars there is no doubt it is a solidarist international association, 
indeed the most solidarist association of nations yet achieved. More precisely it is hybrid of 
state-centric solidarism and cosmopolitan solidarism (Buzan 2014), with the former concept 
capturing the intergovernmental components of the EU and the latter the trans- and supra-
national components. Viewed from this perspective, Brexit can be interpreted as a reaction to 
the failure of elites, particularly in the more Euro-sceptical countries, to apply a brake to the 
increasing cosmopolitan solidarism of the European project. It has been a staple British view 
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that a wider Europe is better than a deeper Europe. Indeed, part of the logic of a wider Europe 
is to make a deeper Europe impossible. To the consternation of many British observers, 
however, Europe has rarely stood still, instead becoming wider and deeper, with profound 
implications for national democracy. 
Of course, Britain successfully negotiated a budgetary rebate, and a series of ‘opt-outs’ from 
the Schengen Area, the Social Chapter on workers’ rights, the single currency, and the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. In the run-up to Britain’s referendum, David Cameron secured a 
renegotiation of Britain’s membership, repeating the approach of Labour prime minister Harold 
Wilson before Britain’s 1975 referendum (Glencross 2015). The 2016 renegotiation secured a 
series of changes, with the UK’s exclusion from the EU’s commitment to ‘ever closer union’ 
being the clearest example of resistance to cosmopolitan solidarism. However, Cameron failed 
to secure, as had Wilson before him, all the concessions he sought (Smith 2016). Crucially, he 
failed to secure concessions on free movement of labour, the EU resisting any limitation on the 
four principles—freedom of movement for labour, goods, services and capital—on which its 
Single Market is based (Oliver 2018).  
One upshot of Britain’s limited success in putting a brake on accelerating cosmopolitan 
solidarism is that it created the impression, among an electorate fed a daily diet of Euro-hostility 
by the popular press, that ‘Europe’ was set inexorably on a disagreeable course (Daddow 2012). 
It also created the problem that when it came to making the case for the EU in the referendum 
those heading the Remain campaign were themselves, with regard to several of the most 
important lines of EU policy and institutional development, Eurosceptics, or at least deeply 
uneasy about showing pro-European sentiments. This was most notable in the Prime Minister 
himself. Before assuming office, Cameron had helped found the Euro-sceptic Movement for 
European Reform, had pledged to pull Britain out of the Social Chapter, and in 2005 won the 
Conservative party leadership on a promise (later fulfilled) to take the Conservatives out of the 
European Peoples Party, the leading pan-European group of Conservative and Christian 
democrat parties. Leaving the group, seen by many Conservatives as ‘federalist’, limited 
Cameron’s connections with other centre-right leaders and parties, most notably Germany’s 
Angela Merkel and her CDU party. For Cameron, however, managing the solidarity of the 
Conservative party was far more important than advancing solidarity within the EU.  
It was not just the Conservatives who struggled with a commitment to European solidarity. 
Differences over Europe had helped split the Labour party in the 1980s. Even Tony Blair, one 
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of Britain’s most pro-European prime ministers, was once described as an ‘anti-anti-European’ 
(Donnelley 2005) for his willingness to attack Eurosceptics but his reluctance to make a pro-
European case directly to the British people. One consequence of this was that when it came to 
the 2016 referendum many in the Remain camp found themselves arguing not for the 
increasingly cosmopolitan solidarist EU that did exist, but for a more limited state-centric 
solidarist EU they would prefer to exist. They found it hard to be passionate about the actually-
existing EU, only the much-reformed EU of their desires. 
Looked at from the perspective of the EU27, however, while costly and destabilising in the 
short run, Brexit may have long run advantages (Martill and Staiger 2018). Britain has never 
been fully committed to the EU project. It has always been half in and half out.iii While it is not 
good to lose one of its oldest, largest, and wealthiest members, the prospects for a less 
compromised cosmopolitan solidarist development of the community are enhanced. Britain is 
not the only member, however, with reservations about this line of development, with Ireland, 
Poland, Denmark among others all having negotiated significant opt-outs of their own. 
Countries such as France have, not least under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle, also strongly 
resisted integration, unless palpably in French interests. While polling following Britain’s 
referendum indicated a boost in public support for the EU in several member states, the 
challenge of overcoming resistance—or a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 
2009)—to further integration remains significant (Raines, Goodwin and Cutts 2017). Fear of 
losing another member may therefore help to normalize a Europe of multiple speeds and 
variable geometry (Bellamy, Lacey and Nicolaïdis 2017, 488), a prospect which deeply 
disconcerts Europe’s cosmopolitan solidarist elites. In this regard the EU’s moto, In Varietate 
Concordia or United in Diversity, becomes unusually pertinent: how much diversity can unity 
withstand? Are the ever-more complicated compromises between unity and diversity a sign of 
strength or weakness?  
For many, not only in Britain, they are a sign of weakness. With the rise of nationalistic 
populism in many countries, and in the wake of Brexit, elites may well turn away from the 
ambitious cosmopolitan solidarism manifest, for example, in the attempt to devise and 
implement a European Constitution, to a more cautious state-centric solidarism as manifest, for 
example, in the pragmatic Council-led responses to the Euro and migration crises. These 
responses amount to an implicit recognition of the malfunctioning of cosmopolitan solidarism. 
It is interesting to note that of the five scenarios recently presented by the European 
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Commission (2017) on how the Union could evolve by 2025 only one—‘Scenario 5: Doing 
much more together’—could be unequivocally described as cosmopolitan solidarist.  
 
Primary Institutions 
Definitions of primary international institutions abound (Wilson 2012) but they can be thought 
of as ‘set[s] of habits and practices shaped towards the realization of common goals’ (Bull 
1977, 74) or ‘durable and recognized patterns of shared practices rooted in values held 
commonly by the members of interstate societies, and embodying a mix of norms, rules and 
principles’ (Buzan 2004: 181).  The EEC/EC/EU can be seen as an evolving organization that, 
while not yet successfully replicated elsewhere in the world (for the ASEAN experience see 
Wong 2012), has nevertheless had a considerable impact on the primary institutions of 
international society—and not only within Europe but beyond, through its diplomatic 
influence, its policy of pre-accession conditionality, and by force of example. In terms of 
Buzan’s (2004) scheme it might be contended that through the development of supranationality 
in certain areas (e.g. trade, management of the Euro, the environment) the master institutions 
of sovereignty, territoriality and nationalism have been negatively impacted, and those of the 
market and equality of people positively impacted. Similarly, regarding Buzan’s derivative 
institutions, multilateral diplomacy has been strengthened and bilateral diplomacy weakened; 
trade and financial liberalization have been strengthened, and boundaries (i.e. the social, 
economic and political significance of boundaries) weakened. In terms of Holsti’s (2004) 
scheme, the foundational institutions of sovereignty and territoriality have been weakened and 
law strengthened. Regarding his procedural institutions war and colonialism have been 
weakened and trade and the market strengthened.  
To present the picture in this way is of course to present it in highly general terms. Holsti 
provides us with the means of arriving at a more detailed picture through his six-fold 
categorization of institutional change. According to Holsti (2004) institutional change can be 
seen in terms of: novelty/replacement; addition/subtraction; increased/decreased complexity; 
transformation; reversion; and obsolescence. In modern international society, for example, 
trade is a novel institution, and colonialism has become obsolete. The traditional institutions of 
sovereignty, international law, and diplomacy remain highly institutionalized but with much 
added complexity. War exhibits the most complex development, suffering de-
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institutionalisation and reversion to pre-Westphalian Hobbesianism in many parts of the world, 
increased regulation in others, and among OECD countries, obsolescence. 
In these terms the EU has added complexity to the institution of sovereignty. This has been 
achieved, for example, by enshrining EU law as superior to domestic law, making EU 
directives binding, establishing qualified majority voting in several policy areas, and by 
establishing demanding criteria for membership. At the same time the symbols, rituals and 
myths of national sovereignty have been jealously guarded, and the interpenetration of the 
business of national governments contrasts sharply with the continued isolation of national 
parliaments (Wallace 1999: 96-99). Diplomacy has also been rendered more complex through 
the many channels and forms it now takes within the EU. The same could be said for the market 
and the equality of peoples, due to the many rules now regulating economic activity within the 
Single Market, and the growing body of rules protecting the rights and well-being of workers, 
minorities, children and refugees. The sheer complexity of a member state’s connections to the 
EU was shown by the British government itself, when between 2011-13 it undertook a 
comprehensive review of the EU’s powers. The resulting ‘Review of the Balance of 
Competences’ produced 32 reports covering everything from taxation and transport to 
economic policy and the environment. To the frustration of Eurosceptics, none of the reports 
concluded that powers needed to be repatriated (Emerson, 2015). 
While sovereignty has been rendered more complex, nationalism has been transformed. The 
idea of separate and distinct national interests that it is the duty of the statesperson to always 
put first, has been in retreat with the growth of the EU. This is not to say that member states do 
not sometimes put their own interests above the community. Nationalism in this sense is far 
from obsolete. It is to say that for the first time in the history of the modern state system a group 
of established nation-states—and ones that were at the centre of two world wars—have agreed 
to consider the interest of the wider community before acting in any given area, and to avoid 
actions that could be deemed ‘non-communautaire’. Similarly, the balance of power—for Bull 
(1977, 106-7) the master institution of international society—has been radically transformed 
by the pooling of sovereignty (Diez, Manners and Whitman 2011, 126-7). Through the 
delegation of executive and legislative powers to supranational bodies such as the European 
Commission and the European Central Bank, and the forging of common policies most notably 
in the areas of trade and competition, member-states no longer fear the local preponderance of 
large powerful states. While not entirely obsolete, balancing the power of Germany or France 
is no longer the central game in European international politics.  Finally, thanks to a 
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combination of primarily the EU and NATO (which institutionalised the US security guarantee 
to Europe), war has been transformed in the relations between EU member states, from a 
practice frequently employed to settle differences, acquire territory, and increase power, to a 
measure employed exclusively against external actors and threats, and only in the most 
exceptional circumstances in defence of fundamental community values. In Holsti’s terms it 
has become obsolete within the walls of the Union but highly institutionalized without. 
The fact of one member, albeit a prominent one, leaving the group does not necessarily imply 
any reduction in the number of primary institutions at work in Europe, nor any loss of 
complexity, or any brake on transformation. Yet there is no question that Brexit represents the 
most explicit reassertion of sovereignty within the EU to date, and the most significant 
challenge to the retreat of nationalism. It may also breathe new life into the institution of the 
balance of power, as for the first time in nearly half-a-century a major western European state 
will be situated outside of the zone of pooled sovereignty (Krastev and Leonard 2010; Simón 
2015). It would be naïve to rule out the possibility of new power dynamics, including those 
generated by rising German hegemony, real or perceived, especially within the Eurozone. 
Regarding equality of peoples, diplomacy, the market and war there is no reason to expect any 
significant institutional change. Brexit does entail, however, some reversion to sovereignty and 
nationalism as legitimating principles of what has been termed (Diez, Manners and Whitman 
2011) the European regional international society (ERIS). To this extent it is a challenge to 
inter- and supra-nationalism.  
The wider systemic consequences will be contingent on the nature of the post-Brexit 
relationship, in particular the extent to which Britain continues to identify with core EU values 
and comply with its rules and regulations (Diez and Whitman 2002: 57; Springford and Lowe 
2018). It will also be contingent on the extent to which separation from the EU will attract other 
states, which in turn will depend on the success Britain makes of it (Martill and Staiger 2018). 
Perhaps the EU was too confident that the days of sovereignty were numbered; too complacent 
in the face of a recrudescence of nationalist sentiment? Maybe there is something in the 
argument that European integration has been driven by and designed for political and 
administrative elites who have grown insensitive to the attitudes and desires of their publics 
(Calhoun 2016; Burgoon, Oliver and Trubowitz 2017)? 
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Great Power Status 
One issue conspicuous by its absence in the EU referendum debate was Britain’s continued 
great power status. Many people in Britain, including among what is presumptiously called the 
political class, still possess a great power mindset. This is partly due to an uncritical view of 
Britain’s ‘glorious’ past, its tremendous nineteenth-century industrial, technological and 
commercial might, the position of the Bank of England for a century as the world’s central 
bank, its empire on which the sun never set, its indomitable navy, and its self-image of 
‘standing alone’ against Nazism. But it is also due to its name. ‘Great’ Britain carries with it 
the assumption of great power status without having to think hard about criteria. Parliament’s 
vote in July 2016 to replace the submarines carrying Britain’s ‘independent’ nuclear deterrent, 
at a cost likely to exceed the official estimate of £31bn, can be seen in this context. Does the 
Trident nuclear programme give Britain much extra security? Arguably not. The threats to 
British security are many and varied but direct nuclear attack from an enemy nuclear power or 
‘nuclear blackmail’ is not uppermost. France, however, has nuclear weapons, as do all 
permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Abandoning them, unilaterally, 
would reduce Britain’s status in the world, bad enough vis-à-vis rising powers such as India 
and China, intolerable with regard to established and more local rivals such as France. This is 
a widely held perception, extending across the political spectrum, as the overwhelming vote in 
Parliament to replace the fleet testifies. The tautological nature of the argument escapes all but 
a few: Great Britain has to have nuclear weapons because she is great, she is great because she 
has nuclear weapons. 
While not exercising the minds of the many, the objective basis of Britain’s great power status 
at a time of multidimensional relative decline has certainly exercised the minds of the official 
few, as evidenced by the many strategic defence and other reviews seeking to specify this basis 
in recent decades. Within official circles ‘the idea that Britain is a great power is prevalent and 
an influential factor in determining British foreign and defence policy’ (Morris 2011, 326). 
Precisely what power resources it has at its disposal has been a perennial source of concern. 
The objective attributes of power are a central concern of political realism. It would be wrong 
to assume, however, that for all realists these attributes are exclusively material. For some (e.g. 
Mearsheimer 2001) this is true, at least in theory. But for others (e.g. Morgenthau 1978) in both 
theory and practice power is more complex. Along with population size, industrial output, 
strength of armed forces, technological capabilities, must be added non-material factors such 
as the energy and ingenuity of the population, authority and skill of leadership, public morale, 
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even the quality of country’s civilization (Gellman, 1988). To this equation the ES adds social 
conferment. Great power status is precisely that, a status. It is something socially conferred. 
This does not mean objective and material qualities are irrelevant. But great power status goes 
beyond the possession of certain objective material attributes, leaving the door open in ES 
thinking for a power to have more or less of them and still retain the status. This is a possibility 
of no small importance for a country such as Britain, declining in some ways (e.g. defence 
spending (Dempsey 2018)) but rising or at least flat-lining in others (e.g. ‘soft power’ (McClory 
2015)). It is one to which its leaders, if not its general population, have been highly sensitive. 
Britain’s nuclear capability is one of several elements—including the ‘special relationship’ 
with the US, a global diplomatic and intelligence network, and a capital city that is a global 
financial and cultural hub—that make up her claim to great power status. Closely related is the 
strength and effectiveness of her conventional armed forces. But this strength has been 
significantly reduced in recent decades due to successive budget cuts. Absent Trident, for 
example, the Royal Navy is a shadow of its former self, possessing currently no operational 
carrier fleet. Under the latest Strategic and Defence Review the size of the army is set to shrink 
to its lowest level since 1815. Add to this equation the extensive strategic and operational 
failures in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the criticism of so many aspects of military planning and 
implementation in the Chilcot Report (2016), and the outlook starts to look bleak from a Great 
Power point of view. Some have interpreted a major recommendation of Chilcot, that in future 
‘all aspects of any intervention need to be calculated, debated and challenged with the utmost 
rigour’, as meaning ‘never again’. Military operations on the scale of Afghanistan or Iraq now 
look deeply improbable. While Britain is one of the few NATO members to meet target defence 
expenditure of 2% GDP, and it has deployed troops to bases in NATO allies such as Estonia, 
its capacity for unilateral military action overseas is limited. Britain is by no means a 
conventional great power. 
The underlying health of the economy is the major factor in the calculus of Britain’s might, as 
it has been for over a century (Kennedy 1981). The size and strength of the British economy 
therefore is a key fact in any claim to continued great power status, as the need to repeatedly 
assert that Britain remains the world’s sixth largest economy unsubtly suggests (Morris 2011, 
331). Brexit here casts a dark and possibly long shadow over Britain. Before the referendum 
Britain with its relatively flexible labour market, low corporate taxation, and hospitable 
environment for inward investment, was among the higher performing EU economies—despite 
being one of the economies hardest hit by the 2008 financial crisis and ensuing recession.  Since 
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the referendum, however, it has been one of the poorest performing economies (Springford, 
2018). In part this is because British government has become so consumed by Brexit that 
management of the economy has been neglected. It is impossible to predict how long the 
economic uncertainty triggered by Brexit will last, and what impact this will have on the 
economic fundamentals of investment, productivity and growth. Much depends on the terms 
of the separation and the arrangements put in place for Britain’s trading and wider economic 
relationships (House of Commons Treasury Committee 2016; House of Commons Exiting the 
EU Committee 2018). Far from fearing Britain’s future place in the world economy many 
prominent Brexiteers anticipate a bright economic future, free of the constraints and costs of a 
heavily bureaucratic Europe. This may come to pass, but few deny that the road will be long 
and difficult. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous section, the likely degree of separation 
and regulatory independence is much disputed. That Brexiteers and the British government 
have struggled to define the new relationship Britain should seek with the EU, point to the 
weak strategic thinking behind Brexit and Britain’s confused outlook (Oliver 2017). The 
opportunity costs of Brexit and considerable economic and political uncertainty engendered 
only adds to the pressure on Britain’s great power status from other sources. 
Britain’s decline from primus inter pares among the great powers to her current ambiguous 
position has been steady and relentless. The rather neglected ES scholar F. S. Northedge 
entitled his study of British foreign policy in the inter-war years The Troubled Giant (1966), 
and his successor volume taking the story up to Britain’s entry into the EEC in 1973 Descent 
from Power (1974). For many, including the Prime Minister who took Britain into the EEC, 
Edward Heath, and leading figures in other political parties such as Roy Jenkins and David 
Owen (although Owen now backs Britain leaving the EU (Owen and Ludlow 2017)), joining 
the Community was a means of reducing the trouble and arresting the descent. The period 
1982-2008 may come to be viewed as one in which, whether because of the EEC/EC/EU or 
despite it, these goals were generally achieved. But in terms of Britain’s current and projected 
conventional armed strength, and the current and projected strength of her economy, it is hard 
to see the international community continuing to confer great power status on Britain long into 
the future. 
As part of the ongoing Brexit negotiations, Britain has been able to point to her military 
contributions to the defence and security of Europe, the retention of which is an important goal 
of some EU member states (Oliver 2018). Various proposals have been mooted as ways to 
allow Britain and EU to continue cooperating. Some states such as Denmark (which has an 
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opt-out from EU defence cooperation), have continued to pursue bilateral defence links with 
Britain. Other proposals envisage Britain gaining some access to EU decision making in this 
area (Whitman 2016; Giegerich and Mölling 2018). However, institutional and legal problems 
combined with a desire by the EU27 to push forward with EU foreign, defence and security 
cooperation means Britain risks finding itself excluded or having to seek links through channels 
such as NATO (Martill and Sus 2018). The ambiguity of Britain’s international position seems 
set to intensify. 
Yet along with her soon-to-be-renewed nuclear forces Britain still takes its seat among the P5 
on the UNSC. Does Brexit strengthen or weaken Britain’s claim to this seat? There can be no 
doubt that Britain has been able to resist the periodic calls for revision of her position due to it 
being a leading member of a closely-knit association of nations which collectively represents 
a population of over 500m, with a GDP greater than the US. Put Britain outside this association, 
however, and her claim begins to look weaker. A lot will depend on the skill of Britain’s post-
Brexit diplomacy, not least building new friendships and alliances and strengthening some old 
ones, notably with the US and within the UN (Dee and Smith 2017). It is important to note, 
however, that alongside her military resources Britain’s diplomatic resources have been 
depleted in recent decades, especially across Europe. This has been partly for economic 
reasons, but also because of the concentration of more and more diplomatic activity in Brussels. 
In light of this, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office announced in 2017 that it planned to 
boost spending in EU capitals, largely at the cost of spending in other areas of the world (Elliott 
2017).  This was in recognition of the need to compensate for Britain’s move from being a 
decision-maker in Brussels to a decision-taker and, at best, a decision-shaper. Forging a new 
path in the wider world, including the UN, will require similar investments in Britain’s wider 
diplomatic network, but at a time when the public finances are under sustained pressure.  
The issue of Britain’s permanent seat on the UNSC, as with her great power status generally, 
did not arise in the EU referendum campaign. This can only be explained by complacency and 
ignorance—complacency over the continuation of Britain’s status allied with ignorance of the 
effort that she daily spends in the UN system defending and protecting it. It is for example a 
major reason why Britain has stepped up her effort to meet the UN-defined foreign aid target 
of 0.7% gross national income. Britain is now the second largest international aid donor after 
the US, much of this aid being channelled through the UN. In addition, Britain is the sixth 
largest contributor to the UN’s general budget (contributing 4.7%) and to its peacekeeping 
budget (contributing 5.8%) (Dee and Smith 2017, 528). She may not have the guns to sustain 
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her claim to a permanent UNSC seat but she has the generosity. Despite being one of the 
world’s smallest recognised nuclear powers, possessing just 1% of the world’s stockpile of 
warheads, Britain is a leading player in UN nuclear diplomacy. She may not be a great power 
in the old sense, but she is a great responsible (Bull 1977, 288; Brown 2004). Such is the 
narrative Britain has been skilfully spinning.  Outside of the EU it can still be spun, but the 
threads will need to be much stronger to bear the weight of Britain’s case in the future (Kitchen 
and Oliver, 2017). 
Conclusion 
Applying ES theory to the problem of Brexit does not provide us with a clear set of probable 
outcomes. It highlights, however, the ongoing tension between state-centric and cosmopolitan 
solidarism in Europe, particularly in sensitive areas such as migration and economic and 
monetary union. It also suggests a reversion to the Westphalian institutions of sovereignty and 
nationalism, or at least a questioning of the elite aversion to these institutions which, in the 
absence of the development of a ‘thick’ European culture and identity, is unlikely to go away. 
Likewise, it suggests a weakening of the ‘EU core’ (Diez and Whitman 2002, 60) of the ERIS, 
or at least a rebalancing of the relationship between this core and the states that form its 
periphery. While adjustment problems and costs are likely to be considerable, however, the 
sense of community reflected and fostered in such bodies as the Council of Europe (with its 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)), the OSCE and NATO (see Stivachtis and 
Webber 2011, 102), bodies which Britain has no intention of leaving (despite occasional 
rumblings over the ECHR), suggest that from an international society perspective the likely 
consequences for international order of Brexit are limited. The complex mix of insiders and 
outsiders that constitutes the ERIS will be made more complex, especially if Britain secures a 
‘bespoke’ deal with the EU, but this does not imply any weakening in the common values and 
interests which underpin international order. It will, however, imply some adjustment in its 
rules and institutions.  
Even so, the dense network of rules and institutions that define the ERIS and go to the heart of 
the stability it has provided over the last five decades is unlikely to be significantly disturbed 
or diminished. For this to happen, something far more severe and significant would need to 
occur to the ERIS (Webber 2014; Kearns 2018). The international systemic consequences of 
Brexit, therefore, may not prove to be deep or far-reaching. Yet the additional pressure Brexit 
puts on Britain’s precarious great power status cannot be ignored. This is perhaps the most 
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important consequence of Brexit from an ES point of view. It is one that has implications not 
only for Britain’s but also Europe’s power and influence in the world. One cannot therefore 
rule out indirect systemic consequences of this dramatic and unprecedented realignment of 
Britain’s international relationships. 
Notes 
i This is a revised version of papers presented at the annual EISA conference, Barcelona, September 2017, and 
the annual ISA conference, San Francisco, April 2018. We are grateful for the many helpful comments and 
suggestions received, and especially to Spyros Economides and Olivia Nantermoz who carefully read and made 
helpful comments on later versions. 
ii There is no easy way to capture the entity that is the EU. Attempts include ‘multiperspectival society’ (Diez, 
Manners and Whitman 2011) and ‘multilevel political system’ (Lacey 2016). Most agree that in terms of 
integration it is more than an international organization but less than a single polity, containing thin democratic 
but thicker demoi-cratic elements (Bellamy, Lacey and Nicolaïdes 2017, 490). Demoi-cracy is the normative 
commitment to govern together but not as one (Nicolaïdis 2013; Lord 2017). 
iii Note Bull’s (1982, 161) observation that ‘There is a known antagonism of a majority of ordinary British 
people towards membership of the European Community, carefully kept at bay by the elite who feel (rightly, as 
I think) that they know better’. 
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